REMARKS
PETER H. PFUND*

These remarks were made in October 1992, during the conference on which
this issue is based.

Let me begin by thanking Professor Carrington and the Private Adjudication
Center at Duke University, as well as David Rivkin and the ABA's Litigation
Section, for undertaking possibly the first program in the United States
specifically to note and celebrate the centennial of the first session of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law and to honor that very competent and
professional international organization. I hope that this program and others like
it will take account of this milestone.
In his remarks, Steve Burbank referred to the generous practice of courts in
the United States in according recognition to and in enforcing judgments of the
courts of other countries, when the requirements of due process are met.' I
would like to point out that the U.S. proposal for the Hague Conference to
prepare a recognition and enforcement convention is a proposal for multilateral
negotiations by the member states of the Hague Conference, under the auspices
of that international organization, which would involve many states besides the
United States. The Hague Conference has thirty-eight member states, most of
which could be expected to participate in such a convention if the U.S. proposal
were accepted at the Seventeenth session of the Hague Conference in May 1993.
The situation in the United States would be relevant only as a situation in one
of the many countries that would be involved in those negotiations.
Despite Steve Burbank's critical and disappointed observations with regard
to the U.S. handling of the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions, we have
seen progress in the right direction with regard to the recently proposed
amendments to Rules 4 and 26. The Rule 26 Amendments and Committee
Notes, giving rise to U.K., Swiss, and Irish government concerns and U.S. State
and Justice Department objections, have been dropped. The cost-shifting in the
Rule 4 amendments for refusal to waive service of process is being made
inapplicable unless both parties are in the United States. At a minimum, this
removes the basis for objection on the ground that the cost sanctions make
questionable the consensual nature of the waiver request.
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This development resulted in part from a request by Judges Keeton and
Pointer, for which we are very grateful, for a meeting with the Solicitor General,
the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, and representatives of the
State and Justice Departments and the U.K. Embassy. That meeting resulted
in a consensus favoring the recommendation of the minority of the Advisory
Committee that the cost-shifting be dropped if the defendant is abroad.
At that meeting, the State Department representatives were asked and
agreed to have the Department undertake a survey of the views of a number of
foreign governments on the following issues:
1. whether and for What reasons they may object to the remaining
proposed amendments to Rule 4 having international effects; and
2. whether a United States judgment, if consent to waive service of
process has been accorded, would be enforceable, or if it might be
considered defective as a service of process in that country, despite
the defendant's agreement to waive service of process.
The Department may have responses and be able to compile them for
consideration by the Supreme Court or Congress before the amendments to
Rule 4 become final. These responses may also be useful when further
amendments to these rules are considered. These recent consultations, coming
after expressions of concern by foreign governments and the State and Justice
Departments, and following the return of certain proposed amendments by the
Supreme Court for further consideration and review, suggest a growing
willingness by the persons that Professor Burbank calls the "Rulemakers" to
give serious consideration to the international implications and effects of
proposed Rules changes.
I hope that in the future the State and Justice Departments will be expressly
invited to become involved early in proposed rulemaking when effects both on
foreign countries and on our treaty and international legal obligations are
foreseeable. So far as the State Department is concerned, the U.K. Embassy
note first brought to our attention the proposals amended following the return
by the Supreme Court of the changes originally proposed to Rules 4 and 26.
It was rather disquieting and embarrassing that the U.K. government was
somehow more aware of these developments within the United States than was
the State Department. The consequent need to catch up has not been
comfortable for any of the agencies and persons involved. While we realize that
the troublesome Rules 4 and 26 changes and Committee Notes were only a
small part of the total proposed amendments, the Advisory Committee of the
Judicial Conference best knows when contemplated changes to the Rules
present potentially troubling international implications for our treaty and other
international obligations. It is only reasonable for the two federal government
agencies accountable for our actions to other countries to be consulted by the
Advisory Committee or the Standing Committee. The State Department has
general responsibility for U.S. compliance with its obligations under treaties and
international law, and the Justice Department is responsible, as the U.S. Central
Authority, for making the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions work in
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individual cases concerning the U.S. government. Of course, the Justice
Department may not always consider the responsibility of the Office of Foreign
Litigation (within the Department) to be as great as the whole Department's
interest in some matters as a litigating agency. That fact may provide reason
for the State Department in the future to comment on proposed changes to the
Rules for itself and not in conjunction with the Justice Department.
I appreciate Steve Burbank's suggestion that greater weight should be
accorded to State Department views than in the past. His proposal for a
standing study group to evaluate proposed rules assisting the Department to
prepare comments and monitor other relevant developments deserves further
consideration-but only if he informs me that he would be willing to serve on
such a study group if it should be established!
I have some hesitation about Steve Burbank's and George Walker's idea
that Congress should become more fully involved-Steve's idea of a two-tier
process, by which recommendations of the rulemakers would be implemented
by congressional legislation, and George Walker's idea that for policy with
respect to non-U.S. defendants in transnational litigation as a class, Congress
should be the decisionmaker.2 We have heard Steve and Hans Smit describe
what they called penuriousness based on a powerful congressman's attitude to
the whole field of international judicial assistance.3 Is it not likely that
members of the entire Congress would have little patience for State Department
efforts to argue for sensitivity to the concerns of other countries and the
consequent need for special rules based on the "alien-to-us" concept of service
of process abroad and discovery abroad as affecting their (judicial) sovereignty?
As indicated earlier, my hope would be that the rulemakers would develop a
more complete appreciation for such sensitivities and for the merits of the
concerns of the State and Justice Departments and the SEC, based in part on
those sensitivities, as well as on U.S. treaty obligations and international law.
Discussions like this and the changes made in the proposed amendments and
Committee Notes over the last eighteen months or so let me hope that
improvements in consultations and fuller consideration of the implications
abroad of rules changes can be expected.
Tirning to the unilateralism that concerned Steve, let me suggest that we
have overcome it at least in some areas. The Hague Child Abduction
Convention, discussed in detail by Linda Silberman,4 is being implemented very
effectively by the United States and most other party states. While the
Convention is self-executing in nature and therefore does not necessarily require
federal implementing legislation, the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee
on Private International Law in 1983, three years after the Convention's
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adoption in final form, strongly recommended that there be federal legislation
both to ensure the effective and uniform implementation of the Convention
throughout the United States and to anticipate problems that otherwise might
have necessitated appeals delaying the return of the children involved. The
subsequently prepared Administration bill recommended that for certain
exceptions to the child return obligations under the Convention to be applicable,
a person resisting return of a child from the United States would be required
to meet a "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof-a burden of proof
higher than that required by the language of the Convention. This burden was
considered by the Administration and Congress to be desirable to help ensure
that courts in the United States could not facilely deny return requests on the
basis of the most easily misused exceptions provided by the Convention to the
return obligation it sets forth. If certain other states party to the Convention
had equally required a higher burden of proof for such exceptions, denials of
return inconsistent with the intent of the negotiators could have been avoided
in those countries. The success of the return and visitation rights requests
addressed to the United States that go to final disposition-over 90% as Linda
indicated-attests to an attitude very different from and very much better than
the one attributed by Steve Burbank to the Administration and the courts with
regard to the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions. This is so at least in
the area of wrongful removals and retentions of children abroad.
It may, of course, be that there was always a greater meeting of the minds
on the need promptly to undo wrongful removals and retentions of children
abroad without deciding on the merits of the underlying conflicting custody
claims, than on certain elements of service of process and obtaining of evidence
abroad. Effectively dealing with such otherwise intractable removals and
retentions of children, however, also meets an important need of the international legal order.
On another issue, the United States has yet to ratify its first convention
setting out rules for determining governing law. The Hague Convention on the
Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition and the Hague Convention
on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons, both
formally endorsed by important elements of the private sector, may well be the
first conventions to test whether the United States is ready to make these types
of conventions the law of the land.
Steve Burbank has referred to scarce resources for the work of the Office
of the Legal Adviser. It is his view that more human and other resources are
needed. The private legal and other sectors have, however, been very generous
in the help they have provided to L/PIL. They have filled the breach as only
they can by providing expertise to guide the United States in formulating U.S.
positions on private international law unification and harmonization work, and
by providing experts to represent us in international negotiations. These experts
are accountable to our Department for this representation and their work is
reviewed by both the members of their specialized study group and our
Advisory Committee.
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I should emphasize that budgetary constraints have not, in my view, unduly
limited the numbers of experts whose advice is sought or the diversity of
interests represented on our study groups. Instead, as resources have become
scarcer, the size of our study groups has actually increased. Whereas for the
work on the CISG in the 1970s we had a study group consisting of about ten
experts, for the Hague Conference's intercountry adoption convention project
we have a study group of fifty persons and organization representatives. For the
judgment convention proposal, we have a study group of thirty, and fifty people
attended its first meeting on September 2, 1992. For the adoption convention
project, our mailing list contains 180 interested persons and organizations in
addition to the fifty actual study group members. The persons are informed of
developments and given actual notice of study group meetings that they may
attend. I venture to say that the process by which we get expertise and
guidance is more highly participatory than the corresponding process of any
other country. Only through widespread participation in the process of creation
can we ensure that knowledge of and support for the resulting work products
from the international process will benefit us when in convention form. Private
sector political support for Senate advice and consent to U.S. ratification and
for congressional enactment of any requisite federal implementing legislation is
thereby facilitated.
Private international law conventions are fragile and their implementation
often preempts inconsistent state law provisions. As we do not have a
parliamentary form of government, the mere transmission of a convention of
this kind to the Senate does not ensure favorable Senate action. We need
private sector support; without it, the Senate will simply not act. The very
representative experts from our Advisory Committee and study groups form the
core of potential political support for favorable Senate action and congressional
action on implementing legislation.

